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ABSTRACT International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 62351-6 standard specifies the security
mechanisms to protect real-time communications based on IEC 61850. Generic Object Oriented Substation
Events (GOOSE) and Sampled Value (SV) messages must be generated, transmitted and processed in less
than 3ms, which challenges the introduction of IEC 62351-6. After evaluating the security threats to IEC
61850 communications and the state of the art in GOOSE and SV security, this work presents a novel
architecture based on wire-speed processing able to provide message authentication and confidentiality.
This architecture has been implemented and tested to evaluate its performance, resource usage, and the
latency introduced. Other proposals in the scientific literature do not support real-time traffic, so they are
not suitable for GOOSE and SV messages. Whereas the others exceed the target latency of 3ms or do not
comply with the standards, our design authenticates and encrypts real-time IEC 61850 data in less than 7 µs
—predictable latency—, and complies with IEC 62351:2020.
INDEX TERMS Cybersecurity, GOOSE, IEC 61850, IEC 62351, SAS, SV
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart Grid and modern Substation-Automation-Systems
(SAS) are considered critical infrastructures by governments
and organizations [1]–[4]. Therefore, it is required that they
accomplish strong requirements in the fields of reliability,
flexibility, efficiency, and interoperability, to guarantee their
correct operation. In terms of reliability and interoperability,
communications take a key role. IEC has developed the IEC
61850 standard to overcome the interoperability issues in
an automated substation among industrial and measurement
equipment from different vendors [5]–[7].
IEC 61850 defines the data models, services, and commu-
nication protocols that enable the digitalization of electric in-
frastructures, and integrate the devices which are part of them
and the communications within this type of facility. Layer-2
messages are used to provide services that require delivering
high-speed (low delay) messages [8]. Specifically, frames
must be generated, transmitted, received, and processed by
the receiver in less than 3ms as shown in table 1. IEC 61850
defines that real-time services must be mapped directly to the
Data Link layer (layer-2) to reduce protocol overhead and
achieve required performance levels.
TABLE 1. IEC 61850 time requirements [8].
Application Message Type Time Requirement
Fast Messages GOOSE ≤ 3ms
GSSE ≤ 10ms
Raw Data SV ≤ 3ms
Medium Speed Messages MMS ≤ 100ms
Low Speed Messages MMS ≤ 500ms
Time Synchronization IEEE 1588 > 500ms
File Transfer MMS > 500ms
Within this group of low-delay services, Generic Substa-
tion Events (GSE) is used to provide a mechanism to share
event and status data among SAS. GSE can be subdivided
into two status/event transmission protocols: Generic Sub-
station State Events (GSSE) and GOOSE. GOOSE messages
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are generated and received by Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IED) in a publisher/subscriber multicast model. These mes-
sages do not use mechanisms to confirm delivery. Therefore,
GOOSEs are retransmitted several times to provide a certain
level of redundancy [9]. To define and encode the structure
of the payload of the message, Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1) is used. This way, GOOSE messages generally
transmit binary data, such as indications or alarms. Examples
of GOOSE usage are breaker failure or automatic transfer of
lines.
SV messages allow transmitting sampled digital values in
the form of raw data over Ethernet networks. Data are sent
in a continuous stream that is divided into layer-2 Ethernet
frames. These messages are also encoded using ASN.1 and
must be delivered in less than 3ms. Merging Units (MUs)
perform raw voltage and current measurements in different
points of the substation (from current and voltage transform-
ers) and are transmitted in SV messages. These types of
messages are also based on a publisher/subscriber model and
are encoded using ASN.1. Therefore, IEDs can be subscribed
to streams from selected MUs, to monitor the status of the
substation through SVs and control switch breakers or other
types of devices using GOOSE messages.
In this context, data authentication and confidentiality are
highly desirable features. Unfortunately, the latter has proven
to be a harder challenge than the former, since using asym-
metric cryptography is not feasible to secure real-time traffic.
Even in the newest hardware, the time required to compute
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) digital signature is still in the
order of milliseconds, which is beyond the required latency
for GOOSE and SV messages.
Therefore, our research aims to:
• Analyze security threats to IEC 61850 communications,
vulnerable to cyber-attacks.
• Evaluate current security solutions for GOOSE and SV
messages.
• Provide both data authentication and encryption for real-
time IEC 61850 traffic.
• Comply with the suitable standard, IEC 62351:2020.
• Support, in the same Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA), 1Gbit s−1 of Ethernet data throughput.
• Integrate the design in commercial systems for SAS.
After validating both in simulation and in a real imple-
mentation, the resulting design has been made modular, to
support future upgrades of the standards, protocols or algo-
rithms. Required performance has been reached by means of
parallelization and pipelining in powerful FPGAs. Last but
not least, area usage figures show that our solution can be
integrated into SAS.
Below, Section II describes potential cyber-threats to IEC
61850 SAS. Section III expounds the features of the IEC
62351-6 standard and its state of the art. The proposed so-
lution is presented in Section IV, measures and results, in V,
and is compared in VI. Section VII concludes the article.
II. SECURITY THREATS IN SAS
IEC 61850 defines the communication protocols used in
the scope of a substation and opens the path of digitaliza-
tion and standardization. The progressive integration of the
Operational Technology (OT) with the Information Tech-
nology (IT) one introduces new vulnerabilities. Information
between devices is distributed in the form of Ethernet frames,
which can be easily sniffed, altered, or recorded and played
back [10]–[12].
IEC 61850 does not specify any cybersecurity mechanism,
since the standardization of the security aspects was left to be
later defined by the IEC 62351 family of standards. However,
IEC 62351 was released several years after IEC 61850, many
IEDs from different vendors do not support IEC 62351 [13].
Therefore, alternative security solutions may be combined
with the security mechanisms defined in IEC 62351 to protect
current and future IEC 61850 based substations. After an
extensive analysis of the IEC 62351, authors in [14] describe
that the need to preserve partial backward-compatibility has
led to some design choices related to the security protocols
and standards described in IEC 62351 that provide less se-
curity than could have been achieved with a more ambitious
approach.
A. HIGH LEVEL VULNERABILITIES
Since the definition of IEC 61850 and the first implemen-
tations of power substation networks based on the standard,
several real-world security attacks have proven the lack of
protection of the infrastructure, devices, and some of the
protocols used. Slammer worm infected a nuclear plant’s
control system that caused its failure. This cyber-attack by-
passed the protection mechanisms and disabled the safety
monitoring system for nearly five hours [15]. Similarly,
several industrial sites in Iran were infected by a computer
worm called Stuxnet. Among them, there was a nuclear
plant that used Siemens industrial control programs based
on Microsoft Windows [16]. Stuxnet was the first known
cyber-attack on Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems. It was used to get knowledge about the
operation of the system, and then to take control of devices
in the network and cause their failure.
Previously described events are attacks to high-level com-
munication protocols, devices, and systems that do not have
low latency time requirements, as in the case of GOOSE
and SV messages. In [17], firewalls, Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS), Anti-Malware software, or patches to the
software packages are proposed as key elements to prevent
these types of attacks. Furthermore, secure communication
protocols, such as Internet Protocol security (IPsec), Media
Access Control security (MACsec), or Transport Layer Se-
curity (TLS) have also been proposed in the past to protect
messages with no real-time requirements [18]. In [19], the
use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) or almost any kind
of tunneling technology over Ethernet is proposed to secure
communications between substations.
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B. GOOSE AND SV VULNERABILITIES
There are several vulnerabilities of IEC 61850 GOOSE and
SV messages that have been discovered by researchers and
described in the literature. In [20], a spoofing attack is
described where it is possible to send fraudulent GOOSE
messages to a receiver. After recording GOOSE traffic, the
attacker changes several fields of the messages, such as data
values and Sequence Number Value (stNum). Modified mes-
sages are sent by the attacker and validated by the receiver
if the stNum is higher than the last received message marked
as valid and the timestamp of the frame is not older than two
minutes. Similarly, authors in [21] and [22] analyze spoofing
attacks against IEC 61850 systems.
The lack of security mechanisms for IEC 61850 in the
form of message authentication or data encryption allows an
attacker to perform injection attacks. As described in [23]
and [24], capturing messages sent by a legitimate device
in the network gives an attacker the required information
to generate fraudulent messages with erroneous content that
could cause undesired results such as equipment or service
failure. Unlike in the case of spoofing attacks, knowing the
stNum and the destination address of the message.
Modifications to the stNum field of GOOSE frames are
also used in [25] to perform a Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
In this case, the attacker changes the value of the stNum field
to (232 − 1), which is the highest value before an overflow
happens, forcing the receiver to set its internal counter to that
value and rejecting all the legitimate messages received from
the sender whose stNum value is smaller.
Flooding attacks in IEC 61850 communication systems
are extensively studied in [26] and [27]. They allow an
attacker to inject false messages in the network, which could
be real messages previously captured with the sole purpose
of consuming communication or processing resources that
could prevent legitimate messages from being delivered or
processed on time. Hussain et al. [28] have reviewed the
different security threats and attacks that can be used to
compromise IEC 61850 messages. Specifically, GOOSE and
SV messages suffer from integrity and availability threats by
the means of replay, integrity violation, masquerade, DoS,
data manipulation, or false injection. Additionally, GOOSE
and SV messages are also sensitive to confidentiality threats,
since not having access to the content of the messages pre-
vents an attacker from performing the majority of the attacks
previously defined.
As demonstrated by previously discussed cyber-attacks
to SAS, they may have several impacts on the behavior of
the substation, which can cause malfunction, performance
issues, or total failure of part of the communications systems,
or even the whole substation. The most common impacts of
cyber-attacks are listed below [29]:
• Interruption of monitoring system: IED is not able to
receive data from MUs or other IEDs, data are corrupted
or IED is unable to process data as expected.
• DoS to control system: IED cannot send control com-
mands to circuit breakers and protection devices or its
operation has been modified by an attacker.
• Interruption of protection communication: protection
device cannot receive commands from IEDs.
• Undesirable protection operation: protection device re-
ceives fake commands or it does not operate accord-
ingly.
• Network interruption: devices in the substation are un-
able to communicate with each other. This represents a
high-risk situation for the integrity of the substation and
the service provided.
III. GOOSE AND SV SECURITY
IEC 62351-6 [30] defines the security procedures for peer-
to-peer and Layer-2 profiles such as GOOSE or SVs. On
the other hand, IEC 62351-9 [31] defines how to generate,
distribute, revoke and handle digital certificates as well as
the cryptographic keys that are used to protect IEC 61850
based communications. Other sections of IEC 62351 provide
security mechanisms to protect IEC 61850 related communi-
cations and services that do not have real-time requirements.
Fig. 1 shows how the standards defined in IEC 62351 are
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FIGURE 1. IEC 62351 security layers.
A. IEC 62351-6
To address previously discussed attacks and vulnerabilities of
GOOSE and SV messages, IEC released section 6 of the IEC
62351 document. This chapter [30] defines the security pro-
cedures for peer-to-peer and layer-2 profiles, such as GOOSE
or SVs. Instead of using general-purpose security mecha-
nisms, such as TLS, a specific solution has been designed
to make sure that messages with stringent time requirements
are delivered on time. In this case, authentication is defined as
mandatory. On the other hand, encryption is optional, since
the added computational overload could prevent slow devices
from meeting the time requirement of 3ms to deliver this
type of messages. Message authentication is provided by the
means of a digital signature using a hash function, which
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ensures that the data has not been modified by a third party
(data integrity) and that the data has been sent by a legitimate
device (data authenticity).
Implementing message authentication prevents an attacker
from modifying or generating fake messages. However, as
data confidentiality (encryption) is only set as optional by the
standard, anyone with access to the substation network could
capture all the GOOSE and SV messages in the network,
to get information about the status and the behavior of the
substation. That information could be used by an attacker
to determine the best way to exploit possible vulnerabilities
in other devices of the substation. Hence, data confidential-
ity is a highly desirable feature that presents an additional
challenge in comparison with integrity and authenticity, as
the additional computational overhead introduced needs to
be small enough not to compromise the delivery time of the
GOOSE and SV messages.
B. STATE OF THE ART IN IEC 62361-6
Since the first version of IEC 62351-6 released in 2007, the
research community has analyzed and evaluated its feasi-
bility. In [32], a report of the performance impacts of IEC
62351-6 is carried out. As described by the authors, asym-
metric cryptography is not a viable choice for securing real-
time traffic, especially in systems with limited computational
resources, such as IEDs or MUs. They generate digital signa-
tures using a software implementation of the RSA algorithm,
as specified in the standard. Results show that the minimum
time needed to generate the digital signature is 1.5ms, and
up to 4ms when a recommended key length of 1024 bits
is used. This demonstrates that implementations of the RSA
algorithm for protecting GOOSE and SV messages are non-
viable. In [33], the authors present a similar test using the
latest hardware available with the aim of evaluating if using
high-performance processors could make RSA implemen-
tations suitable for protecting GOOSE and SV messages.
Results confirm that, even on the latest mainstream hardware,
the time required for RSA digital signature computation is
still in the order of milliseconds.
As an alternative to RSA, [34] proposes the usage of
RSASSA-PSS digital signature algorithm based on RFC
3447. This algorithm demands less processing power and,
therefore, is expected to improve the performance achieved
with RSA implementations. Results confirm an improve-
ment in comparison with RSA. However, neither RSA nor
RSASSA-PSS are fast enough to secure GOOSE or SV
messages without compromising the target delivery time of
less than 3ms.
After receiving all the feedback from the scientific and re-
search community about the issues to generate digital signa-
tures for GOOSE and SV messages using the RSA algorithm,
IEC has been working on a new version of the current draft.
IEC 62351:2020 was released in 2020 and replaced RSA
with Secure Hash Algorithm-256 (SHA-256) and Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) Galois Message Authentication
Code (AES-GMAC) algorithms as shown in Table 2. These
two authentication algorithms are based on symmetric-key
cryptography, which reduces computation load in compar-
ison with asymmetric key cryptographic algorithms, such
as RSA. Therefore, this change is expected to enable the
generation of digital signatures without compromising the
time requirements set by IEC 61850 for GOOSE and SV
messages. However, symmetric-key cryptography requires
that both ends of a communication share a secret key, which
increases the complexity of key distribution [31].
TABLE 2. IEC 62351-6 cryptographic algorithms [35].
Algorithm Bits Usage Security
SHA-256 80 Mandatory Authentication
SHA-256 128 Mandatory Authentication
SHA-256 256 Mandatory Authentication
AES-GMAC 64 Mandatory Authentication
AES-GMAC 128 Mandatory Authentication
AES-GCM 64 Optional Authentication & Encryption
AES-GCM 128 Optional Authentication & Encryption
This new revision of the IEC 62351-6 standard includes
AES Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM), to allow to provide
both data authentication and encryption. This algorithm has
proven to be extremely efficient and achieves both high
data throughput and low latency when implemented in hard-
ware [5], [36]–[38]. However, encryption is still a challenge.
The industry forecasts difficulties to ensure that all the equip-
ment can cipher the traffic. IEC 62351-6 includes encryption
as an optional feature.
There are almost no proposals in the literature that have
faced the challenge of authenticating and encrypting IEC
61850 GOOSE and SV messages as defined in IEC 62351-
6. The majority of the presented solutions just provide data
integrity and authentication, but not confidentiality. In [39]
authors present a GOOSE and SV authentication framework
based on a software implementation. They use the RSA-
Probabilistic Signature Scheme based on Signature Scheme
with Appendix (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5) as the digital sig-
nature algorithm. Results show that the RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 algorithm is too slow for real-time applications such
as GOOSE and SV protection when executed in modern
desktop-class processors. They also describe a message pro-
tection mechanism based on SHA-256. However, they do not
provide performance results for digital signature calculation
based on this algorithm. Additionally, in [32] and [33],
RSA is used to generate digital signatures to authenticate
GOOSE and SV messages. Authors use different families
of processors to analyze how digital signature computation
time is affected by the computational power of each device.
Results show that just server-class Intel Xeon processors
can generate the digital signature in less than 1ms. Finally,
GOOSE and SV digital signature based on AES-GMAC and
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algo-
rithms is also analyzed. These symmetric-key cryptographic
algorithms allow that even low-performance hardware, such
as a Raspberry Pi 2 or a BeagleBone, were able to com-
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pute the digital signature in a few microseconds. Similarly,
in [40], authors use an Intel Celeron processor with 4GB
RAM to evaluate the performance of message authentication
using AES-GMAC and HMAC-SHA256 algorithms in low-
performance devices. Results show that end-to-end delays for
GOOSE messages authenticated with previously described
Medium Access Control (MAC) algorithms are within the
requirement of 3ms even in worst-case scenarios.
In [41] authors present their solution to provide authen-
ticity and data encryption to GOOSE and SV messages. Ac-
cording to them, IEC 62351-6 does not specify any method
for ensuring confidentiality. However, as shown in Table 2
and previously discussed, AES-GCM is used to provide data
encryption and authentication. Furthermore, they propose 3
methods derived from IEC 62351-6 that use AES and SHA-
256 to protect communications in three different ways. The
first one, which they call Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM), encrypts
the GOOSE Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) using
AES, and then calculates the digital signature over the en-
crypted data, using SHA-256. This requires encrypting data
first, and then performing the digital signature calculation
in transmission, whereas in reception data can not be de-
crypted until they have been used for calculating the digital
signature. As a consequence, frame protection times can
increase significantly. The second method, Encrypt and MAC
(E&M), encrypts GOOSE APDU and calculates the digital
signature over the unencrypted GOOSE APDU. The problem
of this procedure, which is also applicable to EtM, is that,
as the GOOSE APDU is encrypted with AES, certain parts
of the frame with fixed values will always provide the same
result, if they are encrypted with the same key. Therefore,
an attacker could use this information to get the secret key
and take access to communications. Finally, in MAC then En-
crypt (MtE), the digital signature is calculated over GOOSE
APDU, and then both GOOSE APDU and security extension
are encrypted. This method makes decrypting the frame
impossible for the receiver, as the IEC 62351-6 extension
where the required cryptographic information is stored has
also between encrypted. Additionally, they suggest exploiting
several unused bits of the GOOSE and SV frames to specify
which method of the three proposed is being performed in
each case. As all the presented solutions are modifications
of IEC 62351-6, interoperability among devices of different
vendors can not be ensured, which is one of the main reasons
for the introduction of IEC 61850.
C. IEC 62351-6 SECURITY EXTENSION
IEC 62351-6 presents, a frame extension over a regular
GOOSE/SV frame. This security extension is located at the
end of the frame and makes compatible the use of insecure
IEC 61850 traffic and IEC 62351-6 protected one. Fig. 2
shows the main fields of a GOOSE/SV frame and all the
relevant sub-fields necessary for frame protection.
According to the standard, the Ethernet MAC header,
composed of the destination and source MAC addresses, as
well as the Virtual LAN (VLAN) field, is kept unaltered and
MAC Header VLAN Extended PDU APDU IEC 62351-6 Extension
Ethertype APPID Length Length of Extension CRC
IEC 62351-6 Header Version ToCK TtNK IV Key ID HASH
CRC
Plaintext Plaintext Authenticated 
Encrypted 
FIGURE 2. IEC 62351-6 security extension.
transmitted as plaintext to allow network devices, such as
switches, to read these fields and forward the frame. The
Extended Protocol Data Unit (EPDU) is composed of the
Ethertype, Application Identifier (APPID), the length of the
APDU, the length of the security extension, and the Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) of the Extended Protocol Data
Unit (PDU). The main difference to a regular GOOSE/SV
frame is that, instead of the length of the security extension
and the CRC, those bytes are unused and marked as reserved.
All the fields of the extended PDU are used to calculate the
authentication signature.
The GOOSE/SV APDU is not modified when the frame is
protected with IEC 62351-6. However, if just authentication
is used, all its content is used to calculate the authentication
hash. On the other hand, if both encryption and authentication
are used, the APDU will be also encrypted to hide its content.
Finally, after the APDU there is the IEC 62351-6 security
extension, which is encoded according to the ASN.1 Basic
Encoding Rules (BER) and is composed of these fields:
• Header: it marks the start of the IEC 62351-6 security
extension, as well as the security parameters used.
• Version: it contains the extension protocol version num-
ber.
• ToCK: Time of Current Key (ToCK) value represents
the seconds since Epoch in which the last key used was
marked as valid.
• TtNK: Time to Next Key (TtNK) value represents the
seconds remaining until the next key to be used will be
marked as valid.
• Initialization Vector (IV): It is an optional field, in case
of the MAC or the encryption algorithm, such as AES-
GMAC, needs an initialization value.
• Key ID: it identifies the key that has been used to protect
the message. This is selected by the sender according
to the ones distributed by the Key Distribution Center
(KDC) and depending on the content of the frame.
This field is required by the receiver to decrypt and
authenticate the message.
• HASH: the calculated HMAC value that authenticates
all the bytes of the frames starting from the Ethertype
and until de APDU (included).
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this work, a novel hardware architecture in the form
of Intellectual Property (IP) core, implementable in FPGA
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and able to process, cipher, decipher, sign and authenticate
GOOSE and SV frames at wire-speed according to IEC
62351:2020 is presented. This proposal aims to overcome the
limitations identified in the state of the art to protect this strict
real-time traffic.
The proposed hardware architecture has been designed
following three main guidelines to face the challenges pre-
viously stated:
• Modularity: it must be a modular design that allows
future upgrades and modifications. This feature will
allow implementing new revisions of the standard, new
security algorithms or protocols, as well as modifica-
tions for protecting other types of traffic with real-time
requirements, such as GOOSE and SV messages.
• Performance: the architecture must make use of ad-
vanced hardware designing techniques such as paral-
lelization and pipelining for processing high volumes of
data.
• Area usage: the proposed design must achieve the re-
quired area usage figures that make viable its imple-
mentation in SAS. Therefore, the architecture needs
to provide enough computing power to process up to
1Gbit s−1 of Ethernet data. Additionally, it must ensure
the applicability of this approach in commercial systems
used for SAS.
Secure key distribution is accomplished by a software
implementation of IEC 62351-9. As defined by this standard,
devices on the substation network are authenticated by the
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) using a one-time password
that allows them to get a digitally signed certificate. Using
it, the devices ask for the keys to the KDC using Internet
Key Exchange (IKE) protocol as part of the Group Domain
of Interpretation (GDOI) protocol. The IEC 62351-6 driver
integrates the IEC 62351-9 stack to configure the keys and
cryptographic information that is required by the proposed
architecture to secure GOOSE and SV frames.
Fig. 3 shows the proposed architecture. It is divided into
six main sections (represented by letters A-F) that perform a
specific task of the process of authenticating and encrypting
a GOOSE or SV frame. One of the key features of this
architecture is that it follows a mirrored design with the aim
of supporting full-duplex operation at wire-speed. Apart from
section F, the rest of the architecture consists of 5 sections
that are duplicated, one instance is for unprotected traffic that
needs to be protected, and the second one is for protected
traffic that needs to be unprotected. All these sections and the
modules that compose them have been implemented using
standard signals by the means of the Advanced eXtensible
Interface Stream (AXI-S) interface, which eases the process
of adding or replacing any part of the architecture, if required
in the future. AXI-S is part of the Advanced Microcontroller
Bus Architecture (AMBA) developed by Advanced RISC
Machine (ARM) that defines an open-source standard for
the connection and management of functional blocks in a
SoC [42].
A. PORT INTERFACE
The port interface module implements several interfaces used
for the communication between the MAC layer and the Phys-
ical (PHY) one, such as Media-Independent Interface (MII)
or Gigabit Gigabit Media-Independent Interface (GMII), to
name a few, and turn them into AXI-S. This provides an
abstraction layer to the rest of the modules in other sections as
they only need to implement a single interface. Furthermore,
this section of the architecture is also responsible for check-
ing and calculating the Ethernet CRC as well as the Inter-
Frame Gap (IFG).
B. FRAME ANALYSIS
The frame analysis module is used to inspect the frames
and extract the data. It analyzes each incoming frame to
determine if it is a GOOSE, SV, or another type of frame.
This task is performed by an advanced parser that can decode
ASN.1 data structures, as defined for IEC 61850. The parser
can also detect errors in the format or the content of the
frame, as well as extract the required data that will be used to
protect or verify the frame. In the case of a frame that needs
to be protected, the parser divides the data into three types:
• Data that do not need to be processed (Ethernet header,
IEC 62351-6 extension, and CRC).
• Data that must be authenticated but not encrypted
(EPDU).
• Data that must be encrypted and authenticated (APDU).
On the other hand, in the case of a frame that is already
protected and needs to be unprotected, the parser gets all the
IEC 62351-6 extension fields in addition to the three data
types previously defined. All this information is provided to
the encryption/decryption controller module (C) to process it.
If the received frame is not a GOOSE or SV frame, it will be
directly forwarded to the output without further processing.
Additionally, in the case of encryption, a random number
generator module is included. It uses a ring oscillator, as
defined in [43], to generate true random numbers that, in
combination with a counter for each new frame, generate the
initialization value required to protect the messages.
C. ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION CONTROLLER
The encryption/decryption controller acts as an intermediate
layer between modules B, D, and F. It gets all the infor-
mation provided by frame analysis module (B) and gener-
ates a request to the lookup engine (section F) to get the
cryptographic key associated with the dataset of the frame.
If the lookup engine has been configured with a key for
the dataset, it will provide it; otherwise, the frame will be
forwarded to the output without further processing. If a key
is available, this section provides to the AES-GCM engine all
the parameters needed to perform frame protection.
D. AES-GCM ENGINE
Fig. 4 shows the internal architecture of the AES-GCM en-
gine, which is a key part of the design. It has been extensively
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FIGURE 3. IEC 62351-6 proposed architecture.
analyzed in [5] and it has been specifically designed to
support different latency/silicon-resources trade-off attend-
ing the targeted performance. It has four main phases that
are carried out for each frame that needs to be processed:
1) The AES-GCM engine initializes the authentication
tag computing logic with the key selected to protect
the frame according to its dataset.
2) The data are encrypted/decrypted using the key and the
Initialization Vector (IV), in addition to a counter that
is set to zero with each new frame and incremented
with each word of the frame.
3) The authentication tag is calculated with the data that
only need to be authenticated (data that do not need to
be encrypted).
4) The authentication tag computing logic is fed with the
encrypted data, which are also authenticated.
This module provides as outputs the encrypted or de-
crypted data (depending on the operation carried out), the
data that only has been authenticated, and the authentication
tag. The AES-GCM engine can process a 128-bit word each
clock cycle which represents a throughput of 16Gbit s−1
with a clock frequency of 125MHz. As the required through-
put is 1Gbit s−1, an instance of the AES-GCM engine
is used for encrypting and decrypting data, which reduces





















































FIGURE 4. AES-GCM cryptographic engine internal architecture.
E. FRAME GENERATOR
The frame generator module receives data from the AES-
GCM engine (D) and the frame analysis module (B) to gener-
ate the encrypted and authenticated frame or to regenerate the
original unprotected frame depending on the use case. This
section is also responsible for checking the authentication
tag in the case of the decryption process. The received tag
is compared to the tag computed by the AES-GCM engine.
If they match each other, the frame is reconstructed and
forwarded to the output. Otherwise, the frame is discarded
as a security measure.
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F. LOOKUP ENGINE
Finally, the lookup engine performs two main tasks. First
of all, it provides the interface to configure the silicon IP
and check its status. Among the configuration parameters,
there is the possibility to set all the cryptographic parameters
specified by IEC 62351-6 for each dataset that needs to be
protected. It is important to note that, as a security measure,
this information can only be written, to avoid undesired
access to cryptographic keys or other sensitive information
stored. The second task is searching the associated key for
each GOOSE and SV frame that is received and determining
if it must be protected or unprotected.
V. RESULTS
The proposed architecture has been evaluated and vali-
dated both in simulation and hardware implementations. To
measure timing performance, two test setups are proposed.
Simulation-based timing performance analysis allows mak-
ing high precision timing measurements, within an accuracy
level of a clock cycle. On the other hand, hardware test-
ing validates latency measurements obtained in simulation.
Finally, functional evaluation of the proposed architecture,
as well as its resource usage, has been carried out using a
hardware implementation of the silicon IP.
A. SIMULATION-BASED TIMING RESULTS
A simulation setup has been designed to check whether the
proposed architecture achieves the low latency values for data
protection that allow reaching the target delivery time of 3ms
as set by IEC 61850. The simulation environment has been
created with Vivado 2018.3 and consists of 2 instances, A and
B, of the IP core, which are interconnected in a daisy chain.
Plain GOOSE and SV frames are received from the insecure
port of instance A of the IP core. After being processed, pro-
tected frames are transmitted through the secure port of in-
stance A of the IP core, which is connected to the secure port
of instance B. Finally, after being analyzed and decrypted,
unprotected GOOSE and SV frames are transmitted on the
insecure port of instance B of the IP core. Result analysis
is carried out using the waveform view of the simulation,
whereas configuration is made by writing and reading the
internal registers of the IP cores from the testbench. Time
measurements are taken at the secure and insecure ports of
both instances of the IP core.
The test consists of sending two sample frames: a GOOSE
frame of 159B and an SV frame of 156B. The test is
executed 4 times modifying the number of frames sent: 1,
100, 500, and 50000 respectively. Additionally, each test is
repeated 5 times modifying the frame injection time to check
if IP core performance is altered. To evaluate the proposed
architecture in a worst-case scenario, frames are sent back-
to-back with an interframe gap of 96 ns. Fig. 5 shows the
results achieved from this test.
These results show that the proposed architecture has a
predictable response time, achieving always the same latency
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FIGURE 5. IEC 62351-6 encryption/decryption and authentication latency.
certain frame size. Frame encryption and authentication have
a latency of 6.743 µs for the SV frame and a value of 6.815 µs
for the GOOSE frame. On the other hand, frame decryption
and authentication have a latency of 4.256 µs for the SV
frame and 4.304 µs for the GOOSE frame. These results show
that, for the worst case, which is GOOSE frame encryption
and authentication, the latency introduced by the proposed
architecture represents just 0.22% of the target delivery time
of 3ms.
This test also shows the wire-speed capability of the pro-
posed architecture. This guarantees resilience against DoS
attacks since the core is capable of receiving, processing, and
filtering every frame, without droping any.
B. HARDWARE-BASED TIMING RESULTS
This test aims to replicate the latency measurement process
that has been carried out in the simulation-based timing test
of the IP core. Apart from the IP cores, additional hardware
has been added to the design that allows taking high precision
timestamps of the inbound and outbound GOOSE and SV
frames. Two evaluation boards from SoC-e based on Zynq
7020 FPGA from Xilinx are used. Fig. 6 shows the block
diagram of the design implemented inside the FPGA in
each board, which has been generated with Vivado 2018.3.
The diagram is divided into two main sections: PL and PS.
Located in the PL there is the IP core proposed to encrypt
and decrypt GOOSE and SV frames. Additionally, four edge
detectors have been included to generate a trigger when a
frame is received or transmitted by the IP core. Using a 64 bit
timer with an accuracy of 8 ns and the outputs from the edge
detectors as input, 4 timestamping units store the value of
the timer in 4 independent memories each time a frame is
transmitted or received. In the ARM CPU located in the PS
side of the FPGA, there is a standalone software running that,
apart from providing the Command Line Interface (CLI) to
configure and check the status of the IP core, also calculates
the encryption and decryption latency of the IP core. As
PS and PL are interconnected with an Advanced eXtensible
Interface (AXI) bus, the CPU can read the timestamp val-
ues stored in the memories previously described. Therefore,
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encryption latency is obtained by calculating the difference
between the reception timestamp of the insecure port and the
transmission timestamp of the secure port. On the other hand,
decryption latency is obtained by calculating the difference
between the reception timestamp of the secure port and the

























FIGURE 6. Hardware-based latency measurement block diagram.
A PC is connected to the CLI of each board and sets the
configuration parameters for the test. The same test described
in the simulation-test is carried out. Results show a deviation
of ± 8 ns (a clock period) regarding the latency measures
obtained in simulation and represented in Figure 5. This
deviation was expected and is caused by the clock domain
changes that are necessary to capture the timestamps. There-
fore, results show the correlation between simulation and
hardware.
C. FUNCTIONAL RESULTS
Fig. 7 shows the test setup used to perform the functional
evaluation of the proposed architecture. Devices A and B
are two evaluation boards from System-on-Chip engineering
(SoC-e) based on Zynq 7020 FPGAs from Xilinx. They
implement the proposed architecture as well as standalone
software running in the embedded ARM processor of the
Zynq FPGA. This software provides a CLI for configuring
and checking the status of the IP core. Additionally, a PC is
used to get access to the IP core and to configure it. This PC
also generates, receives, and captures the GOOSE and SV
frames.
This test is divided into four sections. First, PC 1 is used











FIGURE 7. IEC 62351-6 test setup.
CLI. The configuration parameters include the datasets to be
protected as well as the cryptographic information associated
with those datasets. After that, PC 2 is used to inject regular
GOOSE and SV frames to the insecure port of device A. The
IP core in this board analyzes incoming traffic and protects
it according to the configuration. Protected GOOSE and SV
frames are transmitted through the secure port of the same de-
vice. Next, PC 3 is connected to the path between the secure
ports of boards A and B to capture and analyze secure traffic.
Finally, device B receives traffic from device A on the secure
port. It analyzes the received GOOSE and SV frames and
unprotects them according to the configuration previously
set. Unprotected GOOSE and SV frames are transmitted on
the insecure port of device B and are received by PC 4 that
captures them.
The test consists of sending 50000 GOOSE frames of the
dataset “GEDeviceF650/LLN0$GO$gcb01”. Fig. 8 shows
the status information of devices A and B. As it can be seen,
device A has received 50000 frames on the insecure port
(denoted as processed frames in the figure), all of them being
IEC 61850 frames that have been protected (marked as IEC
62351-6 in the figure) and transmitted on the secure port. On
the other hand, device B has received 50000 frames on the
secure port (denoted as processed frames in the figure) from
device A, being all of them IEC 61850 frames protected with
IEC 62351-6:2020 security extension (marked as IEC 62351-
6 in the figure) that have been unprotected and transmitted on
the insecure port of the device.
Fig. 9 shows a Wireshark capture of one of the 50000
frames received by device A on the insecure port and injected
by PC 2. It is a plain GOOSE frame. The frame has been
divided into 3 sections on the figure. In yellow, there have
been highlighted the source and destination MAC addresses.
In brown, the extended PDU contains two reserved fields
(that will be used in IEC 62351-6). Finally, in green, the
GOOSE APDU is composed of several subfields that are the
content of the GOOSE frame itself.
Fig. 10 shows a Wireshark capture of the frame shown in
Fig. 9, made by PC 3 after it has been processed and secured
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FIGURE 9. IEC 61850 GOOSE unencrypted frame capture.
by device A. This has several modifications in comparison
to the original frame, to be protected as specified in IEC
62351-6. First of all, the reserved fields of the extended PDU
are used for the IEC 62351-6 extension length and the CRC
respectively.
Ethernet Header
Extended PDU Extension Length CRC
Encrypted GOOSE APDU








FIGURE 10. IEC 61850 GOOSE encrypted frame capture (IEC 62351-6).
Furthermore, GOOSE APDU is now encrypted (content is
unreadable), which is the reason why Wireshark marks that
the frame has an internal error. Finally, after the encrypted
GOOSE APDU, there is the IEC 62351-6:2020 security
extension. It contains all the fields specified by the standard
as shown in Fig. 2. It is important to note that, since AES-
GCM has been chosen as the cryptographic algorithm, the
optional IV field also needs to be used.
D. AREA OCCUPATION
Using the test setup presented in Fig. 7, the evaluation of
the silicon (FPGA) resources for a complete implementation
of the proposed architecture has been made. Apart from the
IEC 62351-6 security IP core, the design includes a hard-
ware IP for high-availability Ethernet networking supporting
High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) and Parallel
Redundancy Protocol (PRP) protocols (IEC 62439-3). It also
includes a hardware IP to provide sub-microsecond level time
accuracy, using the IEEE 1588 mechanism. These function-
alities are specified by IEC 61850 and must be implemented
in IEDs of SAS.
Table 3 shows that GOOSE and SV frame security, com-
munications redundancy as well as time synchronization can
fit in a Xilinx Zynq-7020 device. This family of low-cost
FPGAs is suitable for IEDs in SAS, due to their ability
to provide hardware acceleration for several protocols; at
the same time, they include an embedded dual-core ARM
processor and low power consumption.
TABLE 3. Resource usage of each functionality for a Xilinx Zynq-7020.
Functionality LUTs Registers BRAM
IEEE 1588 2631 (4.95%) 1191 (1.12%) 0
IEC 62439-3 13986 (26.29%) 14431 (13.56%) 41.5 (29.64%)
IEC 62351-6 29071 (54.64%) 29997 (28.19%) 85.5 (61.07%)
VI. COMPARISON
In this section results achieved by this work are compared
with the state-of-the-art publications in the field of IEC
62351-6 GOOSE and SV frame security. The first five entries
of Table 4 are software and hardware implementations of dig-
ital signatures to provide data authentication. None of them
implements message encryption. Furthermore, the authors do
not provide maximum throughput supported values, so it is
not possible to know if the performance could be affected
depending on the load. Additionally, all of the software-
based implementations are not able to provide a fixed latency
value: the results depend on the tasks being executed by the
processor. Finally, all of them fail to generate the digital
signature fast enough to meet the 3ms delivery time, as
almost all of them are well above 1ms. In the context of
delivering these messages without security, it is estimated
in the Smart-Grid sector a computation time of 1.2ms for
the message processing by the sender and 1.2ms for the
message processing by the receiver. Therefore, only the re-
maining time (0.6ms) is available for the communications.
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The overhead added by the security mechanism shall fit in
the minimum portion of these 0.6ms.
Therefore, none of the proposals presented in [32] - [34]
are valid to protect GOOSE and SV messages.
Authors in [41] present the only proposal found in the
literature for authenticating and encrypting GOOSE and SV
messages. They describe three methods based on encryption,
using AES and authentication generating a digital signature
with SHA-256. Although the latency figures presented are
low enough to allow frame encryption and authentication
without compromising frame delivery time, all of the pro-
posed methods use modifications over IEC 62351-6. How-
ever, the main drawbacks of these approaches are the lack
of interoperability and their behavior at high-line rates. This
second limitation impacts specifically when multiple SV
streams are present in the same network. Therefore, it is
impossible to evaluate if the solution is suitable for a real
Ethernet network where a data throughput of hundreds of
Mbps or even 1Gbit s−1 can be reached. Finally, as AES
is used as the encryption algorithm, the cryptographic keys
are vulnerable to being known by an attacker. In AES, a
certain plaintext input always produces the same ciphertext
output. As GOOSE and SV frames have fixed fields that
always contain the same value, an attacker could use that
information to guess the cryptographic key used to protect
the communications.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a novel hardware architecture that can
provide data integrity and confidentiality without compro-
mising the message delivery time of 3ms set by IEC 61850.
The presented solution is fully IEC 62351-6 compliant and
only introduces a latency of a few microseconds, which is
several orders of magnitude below the requirement, ensuring
that messages are delivered on time even in worst-case sce-
narios. The proposed architecture always has a fixed latency
for a certain frame size, which provides a predictable be-
havior, essential for real-time messages. Additionally, perfor-
mance and resource usage tests have shown that the silicon IP
can process up to 1Gbit s−1 of sustained Ethernet traffic, and
that it can be implemented in a cost-effective FPGA family,
alongside other redundancy and synchronization protocols
used for SAS. Therefore, this work shows for the first time
that data authentication and encryption can be implemented
for GOOSE and SV messages as defined in IEC 62351-
6:2020 standard.
In the future, we plan to evaluate other security algorithms
defined in the IEC 62351-6:2020 standard and check their
feasibility to accomplish the mandatory delivery time of
3ms. At the same time, interoperability with other suppliers
shall be always ensured.
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